War and Engineering out of control

In recent times, international media have paid a lot of attention to news concerning the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine. It is located 200 km from Crimea and about 700 km east of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. A name that evokes the 1986 disaster (one of the worst nuclear disasters in history, with damages still present and permanent for hundreds of years), which alone is enough to instill anxiety and fear. Could a 'Chernobyl 2.0 in Zaporizhzhia' represent an irreparable disaster of the same magnitude for the entire Europe and beyond?
To understand the current situation in Zaporizhzhia, it is necessary to take a quick trip back in time. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, which led the Ukrainian government to increase energy production to cover the energy losses caused by the blockade of coal and gas. The result was that the Zaporizhzhia plant was forced to become one of the key pillars of the country's nuclear energy. However, the Ukrainian government has faced a severe political and economic crisis, which has resulted in a lack of funds for the necessary modernization of the nuclear power plant and a scarcity of resources to ensure its safety, especially in a war context. In fact, the nuclear power plant is located in a very volatile geopolitical area, still under constant attacks, which make even accessing it difficult, since it has been a strategic target in the current war in Ukraine since March 2022. If you add to this that the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant was built in the 1980s (when the Soviet Union still existed) and many components of the plant have exceeded or are surpassing their technical life cycle, it is easy to see that concerns for safety in Zaporizhzhia are more than justified: a serious nuclear disaster could have a major impact on people, the environment and the habitability of Europe itself.
Without getting into technicalities, we are not dealing with RBMK reactors with a positive void coefficient, but rather with VVER reactors with a negative coefficient, which use water as a moderator, making VVER reactors safer than RBMK reactors, as water is a less temperature-sensitive moderator than graphite, used as a moderator in RBMK reactors. This means that VVER reactors are less sensitive to temperature and pressure changes, and that the risks of accidents and explosions are generally reduced.
So, due to previously explained reasons, there is no real risk of a "reactor explosion" (understood as uncontrolled power increase, excessive pressure and subsequent containment rupture and fire resulting from the contact between hydrogen and graphite control rods with the oxygen present in the air, as happened at Chernobyl), given that the system is completely different and does not use graphite as a moderator. The most tangible danger remains that of a radioactive leak, potentially caused by an external bombardment that could damage the nuclear fuel cladding. This would lead to contamination of the surrounding area, causing atmospheric pollution from material exposed or lifted by potential missile explosions. Geographically, the affected area is that of the Black Sea, in addition to the main rivers of Eastern Europe (which are directly connected to the power plant), which would be irreparably contaminated. However, this scenario should not be framed on a "lower" disaster scale, precisely because it would still represent a radioactive release capable of causing illnesses and cancers. All predictions are extremely negative and potentially lethal for the forms of life in the area, which would become unsafe for an extension of thousands of square miles.
To avoid the risk of a nuclear disaster at Zaporizhzhia, the best strategy considered feasible (and logical) to date is obviously to stop the war, or find a peaceful solution to the conflict. This way, the foundations could be laid for increased safety of the power plant and the area in general in the long term.
The European Union has committed itself on numerous occasions to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, focusing on dialogue and negotiation with the parties involved. However, so far the results have been limited, increasing concern in the international community.
In this situation of instability, it would also be important to make the parties involved understand that taking a series of prevention measures would benefit both the safety of the plant and of themselves. These include monitoring (as already happens) radiation levels, which must go beyond normal routine checks, i.e. be accentuated in order to prevent possible leaks from "at-risk" areas (such as where nuclear fuel is stored), to ensure maximum plant safety. A strategy that could also include greater involvement of international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is playing an active role in promoting nuclear safety worldwide.
Not surprisingly, the European Union (well before the ongoing conflict) has implemented a series of measures to ensure nuclear safety in Europe. In 2014, in response to the Fukushima nuclear disaster, a directive on nuclear safety was approved, which requires Member States to subject all their nuclear facilities to rigorous resilience tests, in order to identify any risks and prevent catastrophic scenarios. The EU has also created a Nuclear Energy Agency tasked with providing technical, scientific and regulatory support to improve nuclear safety in Europe.
Therefore, the situation in Zaporizhzhia remains critical: with all the aforementioned factors that could affect the safety of the structure, it is essential that the international community remains vigilant regarding this situation, constantly monitoring the developments of the conflict and actively promoting nuclear safety throughout Europe. After all, we already know the effects of a nuclear incident: physics makes no exceptions.